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The Eurobond Market-Its Use and Misuse
This Letter discusses the growth, structure, and
attributes of the Eurobond market. An aspect of
this market that has attracted relatively little
attention is the attractiveness of Eurobonds aris-
ing from motives related to tax evasion.
What's a Eurobond?
A Eurobond is a bond issued by a corporation or
public agency outside the national jurisdiction of
any country, and generally not registered in or
subject to regulation by any government. It may
or may not be denominated in the same currency
as that of the issuer's home country. The Euro-
bond market sprang up in the mid-1970s, and
grew rapidly in scope until recently, particu-
larly between 1981 and 1986. In 1987, issuance
tapered off somewhat, leading to speculation
about the demise of the market. However, like
Mark Twain, reports of its demise are premature.
Because Eurobonds are issued outside of the
country of the issuer, they generally are exempt
from most regulations, restrictions, and taxes that
would apply to comparable domestic bonds. It is
estimated that about $750 billion of Eurobonds
currently are outstanding (including non-dollar
bonds), with daily turnover in the secondary mar-
ket of about $13 billion.
Initially, Eurobonds were issued primarily in
fixed-rate form and denominated primarily in
U.S. dollars. Since the early 1980s, increasing
numbers of new issues are denominated in other
currencies. Eurobonds also increasingly include
floating interest rate pricing (with and without
"caps" and "collars"), conversion features, and
warrants, among other things. Eurobonds fre-
quently are combined with swap agreements by
the issuers.
The market for Eurobonds
The primary market for Eurobonds is a direct
placement market. Issuers generally sell directly
to investors without a public auction for the se-
curities. Unlike domestic bonds, Eurobonds are
bearer bonds; the identity of the investor is not
recorded. Moreover, because Eurobonds are not
subject to the same registration requirements and
other regulations as domestic bonds, Eurobonds
can be issued on very short notice. An entire is-
sue may be underwritten by a single commercial
or investment bank, and the secondary market is
well developed.
Issuers of Eurobonds almost exclusively have
been large highly-rated corporations and govern-
mental agencies. In most cases these issuers also
are active borrowers in their own domestic mar-
kets. Even though "Euro" and domestic bond
markets often handle issues by the same firms in
the same currencies, there is evidence that the
Euro and domestic markets nevertheless are seg-
mented. Researchers have demonstrated that
instruments in the two markets are imperfect
substitutes. Considerable spreads between rates
on otherwise comparable instruments issued in
the domestic and the Euro markets often prevail.
Sometimes these spreads are positive, and some-
times negative. "Clientele effects;' where issuers
and investors are imperfectly mobile across mar-
kets, seem to playa role in determining the
magnitude and sign of these spreads.
Several factors may help to explain why these cli-
entele effects exist. First, there is the question of
legal jurisdiction, recourse, and enforcement. It
may be more difficult for the holder of a Euro-
bond than a domestic bond to sue the issuer or
to force the issuer into bankruptcy. Indeed, it is
not even clear how and where such legal pro-
ceedings would take place. This question of legal
enforceability of claims may be the reason that
Eurobonds generally contain few, if any, restric-
tive covenants. The legal questions also may
explain why the Eurobond market is dominated
on the issuers' side by highly-rated borrowers.
Differences in registration and disclosure require-
ments are another factor explaining both the
existence of Eurobonds and the differences be-
tween the pricing of these bonds and domestic
bonds. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission provided impetus to the development of
the Eurobond market when it announced in 1964FRBSF
that any public offering would be exempt from
u.s. registration if it "is made under circum-
stances reasonably designed to preclude distribu-
tion or redistribution of the securities within, or
to nationals of, the United States;' and is carried
out "in a manner which will result in the se-
curities coming to rest abroad:' Eurobond issues
thus avoid the costs and delays associated with
registration of domestic securities. Moreover, in
practice, the SEC waives Eurobond registration as
long as the security is not sold directly to u.s.
investors during an initial 90-day "seasoning
period:' (Eurobonds brought back into the U.S.
are supposed to be registered. It is possible that
many are not.) Thereafter, the security may be
traded in the u.s. Indeed, because Eurobonds are
bearer bonds, it probably is quite easy for a u.s.
investor to purchase the security at issue (during
the seasoning period) through an intermediary.
The taxation of Eurobond interest
The third and perhaps most important feature
that separates the Eurobond from the domestic
bond market is the differing tax treatment of the
two types of instruments. Unlike domestic bonds,
Eurobonds issued by U.S. firms traditionally were
(until 1984) exempt from u.s. withholding tax.
Other Eurobonds often are exempt from with-
holding tax in other countries. A non-U.s. in-
vestor who buys a Eurobond issued before 1984
by a u.s. firm outside the United States essen-
tially would be exempt from u.s. taxation. Bond
earnings might be subject to taxation in the in-
vestor's own country, in the same way that U.S.
investors' earnings on Eurobonds are subject to
U.S. taxation of interest income.
In addition to legitimate business and investment
reasons for holding Eurobonds, there may be in-
vestors who choose to hold Eurobonds to evade
taxation. Because Eurobonds are in bearer form
and the identity of the owner never is recorded, it
is difficult to trace interest income on Eurobonds.
Thus, investors may be able to avoid reporting in-
come from this source and thereby evade taxa-
tion in their home country.
This does not mean that all or even most Euro-
bond investors are tax evaders. But it does mean
that the market may be misused for tax evasion
by some. It also means ~hat tax evasion has sig-
nificance for the structure of and pricing in the
Eurobond market.
Prior to July 1984, non-U.s. investors holding u.s.
domestically-issued securities were subject to
withholding tax. This provided an impetus for the
issuance of Eurobonds through financial inter-
mediaries outside the United States. Eurobonds
issued by U.S. firms in the Netherland Antilles
enabled foreign investors to purchase U.S. se-
curities comparable to domestic securities, but
exempt from withholding. In many instances, for-
eign investors could have recovered the U.S.
withholding tax on comparable domestic se-
curities by meeting certain conditions, including
demonstrating that taxes were being paid on the
interest to the investor's home government. How-
ever, many foreign investors in domestic bonds
preferred not to recover taxes withheld, presum-
ably because they were not reporting the income
at home. This suggests both that the "expense"
of reporting outweighed the loss due to withhold-
ing, and that many overseas investments in dol-
lar bonds. may have been held for purposes of tax
evasion.
The U.S. withholding tax for foreign investors in
U.s. securities was repealed in July 1984. Yet
Eurobond issuance continued to grow, perhaps
in part because it still is easier to hide the iden-
tity of investors in unregistered Eurobonds than
in domestic securities. Many investors in Euro-
bonds make purchases through custodian ac-
counts at Swiss banks. It has been estimated that
in the past 40 to 60 percent of all Eurobonds
were held in such portfolios. Some ofthese funds
undoubtedly were savings that went undetected
and untaxed in their countries of origin. The
Eurobonds may provide both tax-free interest to
such portfolios as well as an absence of a paper
trail leading to the savers who deposited the orig-
inal principal.
Eurobond investment may represent a large flow
of undetected and untaxed income for Ameri-
cans. But the misuse of Eurobonds probably is an
even more serious problem in other countries,
particularly newly developing countries. Euro-
bonds may be the destination for some of the
"flight capital" leaving such countries. In other
cases, funds invested in Eurobonds may originate
in criminal activity. Eurobonds are attractive to
these investors because they offer the security of
low default risk and protection from high inflation
and currency depreciation, together with discre-
tion and secrecy.A Fourth of July firecracker
The bulk of Eurobonds issued by u.s. firms tradi-
tionally were issued through financial subsidiar-
ies in the Netherlands Antilles. Generally, such
Eurobonds were issued with a provision stating
that the bond becomes callable in the event of
any change in tax laws or treaties that would af-
fect the bond, including withholding taxes. On
July 4, 1987, the u.s. Treasury Department an-
nounced a 30 percent withholding tax on Euro-
bonds that had been issued by u.s. firms in the
Netherlands Antilles before 1984, ending a 40-
year old tax treaty. The new rule was reversed a
week later, however, when the wholesale ex-
ercise of the tax call provisions in these Euro-
bonds and the consequent liquidation of a large
segment of the market became a real threat.
The call provision is an interesting example of
strategic planning on the part of issuers. It has
enabled them to forestall any moves toward taxa-
tion by tax authorities. The Treasury Department's
aborted decision and the threatened exercise of
call provisions did leave behind a certain amount
of nervousness in the Eurobond market, though.
While short-term Euronotes, medium-term float-
ing-rate Euronotes and Euro-CDs have different
features from Eurobonds, the lack of registration
and their usefulness in hiding the identity of in-
vestors may be important in those markets as
well. Eurodollar deposits also may be purchased
by those hoping to evade tax scrutiny. In the case
of most bank liabilities, the issuing bank at least
knows the identity of the investor. In such cases
tax authorities may be able to subpoena such in-
formation. Even Swiss banks have exhibited will-
ingness to release such information in certain
cases.
Alive and well
Over the past year, the Eurobond market de-
clined sharply and returned to its 1985 levels.
The 1987 decline was related to a number of fac-
tors, including the October stock market crash,
the fall of the u.S. dollar, high real interest rates
on bonds, diminishing Eurobond profit margins,
and some complaints about trading and mar-
keting procedures. The July 4 action of the U.S.
Treasury compounded the jitters in this market.
Even so, the non-U.S. dollar segment of the Euro-
bond market actually grew in 1987, and U.s.
dollar Eurobonds issued by non-U.s. firms held
fairly steady. The big decline was only in Euro-
bond issuance by U.S. firms.
The market clearly is alive and kicking. The re-
cent decision by Japan to tax savings there may
even lead to a new influx ofJapanese investors
and issuers into the Eurobond market.
The Eurobond market continues to represent a
market where investors and borrowers from all
over the world do business. Its major economic
advantage is the low regulatory and registration
costs associated with Eurobond issuance and
trading. Thus its continued unfettered operation
is desirable. Abuse of this market by those who
would use Eurobonds as an instrument for tax
evasion should be controlled through administra-
tive, regulatory, and legislative coordination on
an international scale, but with a view towards
maintaining the efficient workings of this market.
Steven Plaut
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